We introduce the concepts of joint games and compatibility. In a joint game, members of the grand coalition have the option to split and participate in different underlying games, thereby maximizing their total worths. In order to determine whether the grand coalition will remain intact, we introduce the notion of compatibility of these games. A set of games is compatible if the core of the joint game is non-empty. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility.
Introduction
In this paper, we introduce and study the notions of joint games and compatibility in the context of transferable utility cooperative games. A joint game is defined on the basis of a few underlying games. Each player in a joint game can take part in at least one of the underlying games. A coalition can then take advantage of this option and split itself into sub-coalitions, each participating in a different underlying game. The goal of the coalition is to find its optimal split, the one that maximizes the total worth of the sub-coalitions in their respective underlying game. Thus, the worth of a coalition in the joint game is determined by its optimal split and is typically greater than in each of the basis games. The aim of this paper was to formally introduce the notion of a joint game and to find when it has a non-empty core, which leads us to the notion of compatibility.
Consider, for instance, firms that are capable of producing the same product. Suppose that these firms operate in different countries, but their productivity and endowment change across countries. In this case, a consortium of firms can maximize its total output by properly splitting its members among the countries. The question arises as to whether this consortium of all the firms could be stable. To study this problem, we associate each country with a transferable utility cooperative game. In this game, the worth of any coalition is defined as the maximal production of the coalition if confined to produce in a particular country. This game is a market game and therefore has a non-empty core. However, on a larger scale, where firms can operate in different countries, the corresponding game is a joint game, which might have an empty core. In such a game, the grand coalition, the one that contains all the firms, typically benefits from the opportunity to operate in different countries. However, smaller coalitions may benefit as well, and sometimes on a larger scale than the grand coalition. This could be a source of instability.
Even though the joint game is introduced in a very natural way, its properties cannot be characterized very easily. It is not clear when the core of a joint game will be nonempty, even for very appealing cases when all the games involved are totally balanced or even when they are all convex. The main results of this paper concern the core of the joint game. Theorems 1 and 2 characterize the joint games which have a non-empty core. It turns out that the possibility of having sub-coalitions participating in different underlying games might improve the stability of the grand coalition. In such cases, the underlying games may have empty cores, while the joint game has a non-empty one. This happens when the opportunity to take part in different games increases the worth of the grand coalition to a level that could satisfy all coalitions in a way that would leave no group of players with an incentive to split from the grand coalition. However, this is not the most general case. It might also be the case that the underlying games have a non-empty core, while the core of the joint game is empty; this case is illustrated in the motivating example below that deals with market games (see Sect. 3). It turns out, however, that in this example, if the choices of the operating firms are reduced to only two countries, the core remains non-empty (see Theorem 3).
The study of the core of joint games is surprisingly related to a theory that has been developed in another context, that of decision making. Lehrer (2009) and later on Lehrer and Teper (2008) and Even and Lehrer (2014) introduced and studied the concave integral, which is used to compare different possible actions in a world with uncertainty. Whether or not a joint game has a non-empty core is determined by the concave integrals of the underlying games, when the latter are interpreted as nonadditive probabilities. The Shapley-Bondareva theorem (Shapley 1967 ) characterizes when the core of a game is non-empty; in terms of the concave integral, it states that the core is non-empty precisely when the integral of the indicator of the grand coalition 1 does not exceed the worth of the grand coalition. The main result of this paper has the same spirit. It roughly states that the core of a joint game is non-empty if and only if the sum of the integrals (each is taken with respect to a different basis game) of functions that sum up to the indicator of the grand coalition does not exceed its worth.
Despite the popularity of the core and the well-established existence of multiissue interactions between economic entities, only a few authors have studied the core of combined games or games with the possibility of membership in more than one coalitions. Bloch and de Clippel (2010) look at the core of combined games which are obtained by summing two coalitional games. They conclude that the set of all balanced transferable payoff games can be divided into equivalence classes where the core of the combination of two games is equal to the sum of the cores of the components if and only if the two games belong to the same class, for example, if both games are convex. Nax (2014) studies transferable utility cooperative games with multiple membership and considers economic environments featuring externalities and membership in multiple coalitions, and he proposes definitions of the core for this class of games. His definition of the core depends on what assumptions are made about how society reacts to coalitional deviations. He defines the core for a general conjecture and concludes that the core of a multiple membership game is the set of contracts that are feasible and un-blockable, given the conjecture.
To the best of our knowledge, there are not many papers in the literature of economic theory that discuss the idea of multi-issue interaction. However, in the literature of political economics, there are a few papers discussing this issue among which Conconi and Perroni (2002), Abrego et al. (2001) , Horstmann et al. (2001) and Inderst (2000) can be named.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we introduce the joint game defined over K different cooperative games and state the results referring to the non-emptiness of the core; in Sect. 3, we introduce a motivating example of a joint game and the concept of compatibility using an example from market games. Section 4 deals with the compatibility of games including necessary and sufficient conditions for compatibility to hold. In Sect. 5, we have final comments, and proofs are given in the "Appendix" at the end.
Joint games

Games with the same grand coalition
Let v 1 and v 2 be the worths of two transferable utility cooperative games on a finite set of players N (|N | = n). For all S ⊆ N , v 1 (S) is the worth of S from participation in v 1 and v 2 (S) is the worth from participation in v 2 . For any coalition, S ⊆ N , we suppose that the members of S can decide to participate in either v 1 or v 2 , with the aim of participation being to maximize the worth of the coalition. In mathematical terms, let S 1 and S 2 be two exhaustive and mutually disjoint subsets of S ⊆ N (S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅, S 1 ∪ S 2 = S). The whole coalition S is looking for a partition {S * 1 , S * 2 } such that
(2.1)
Here the coalition has the opportunity to collect a better value by assigning its members to participate in an appropriate game. We can generalize the same argument for K different games v 1 , . . . , v K . Hence, we define a new worth as follows:
Definition 1 A joint cooperative game for v 1 , . . . , v K defined over N , is a cooperative game whose worth is defined as
Here we recall the definition of the core for coalitional games:
Definition 2 The core of a coalitional game with transferable payoffs N , v is the set of all payoff profiles, (
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2} and define the following games:
=∅, the joint game has a non-empty core, C(v 1 •v 2 ) ={(.9, .9)}. This simple example illustrates the typical case that in the joint game, the worths of all coalitions are larger than in each of the underlying games. In this case, the improvement in the worth of the grand coalition is high enough to satisfy all coalitions, making the core of the joint game non-empty.
Remark 1 It is worth mentioning that if we denote the set of all coalitional games on N by G(N ), then (G(N ), •) has an Abelian semigroup structure. That is, • is a commutative, associative operator from
The example shows that we cannot easily replace G(N ) with a smaller set of games (e.g., the set of games with empty cores) and still retain the same algebraic structure.
Extension to games with different grand coalitions
One might argue that in real-world situations, some players can play in one place but not in another. 
for every S ⊆ N .
A motivating example
In this section, we motivate the discussions in the paper, in particular the notions of joint games and compatibility, with an example from market games. Our example follows the same notation for market games as in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) . Consider a firm with n units, denoted by 1, . . . , n, which can operate in K different countries c 1 , . . . , c K . In country c i , unit j produces according to production function f i j that uses m production factors and an endowment of e i j ∈ R m + . For a moment, let us focus on one country, say c i . For any S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, denote the aggregate endowment j∈S e i j by e i S . The optimal production can be regarded as a coalitional game: The worth of S in c i is defined as,
where F(e i S ) is the feasibility set defined as
Now to be more specific, we consider three firms operating in three different countries. We assume that the production function of firm j in country c i , i.e., f i j , is a CobbDouglas function with two inputs, x and y: f i j (x, y) = A i j √ x y, where A i j is the total factor productivity (hence TFP). We assume that the aggregate endowment in each country is one unit of each input; for instance, in country c 1 , the endowments of firms 1, 2 and 3 are (0, 0), (2/3, 2/3) and (1/3, 1/3), respectively. To make things even simpler, we further assume that it is not feasible for firm j to produce in country c j , and therefore, A j j = 0. The following table summarizes the endowments of each firm in each country and its TFP. The game v 1 is given as follows,
The following table summarizes the games v 1 , v 2 and v 3 corresponding to the three countries,
2/9 1/3 0 1/3 2/9 1 1
We now turn to the joint games. We first consider the joint game v 1 • v 2 and show how, for instance,
The values of v 1 • v 2 for different coalitions are given in the following table.
The cores of the games v 1 • v 2 , v 2 • v 3 and v 1 • v 3 are non-empty. For instance, (3/9, 2/9, 7/9) ∈ C(v 1 • v 2 ). However, the core of v = v 1 • v 2 • v 3 is empty. The table of v is the following:
Now let us take a closer look at this example. Observe that when the firms get access to a new market, the worth of each coalition cannot decrease. Therefore, by having access to a new market, firms' core allocations should be at least what they would receive without it.
A simple argument shows that
. In particular, in any core allocation, firms 1 and 2 should receive at most 1/3+1/3 = 2/3. Now assume that access to c 3 becomes available. Since
Thus, in any core allocation of the former, firms 1 and 2 cannot receive more than 2/3. However, with access to c 3 , the worth of coalition (1, 2) is 1, which implies that the core of v 1 •v 2 •v 3 is empty.
On the other hand, access to a new country can again change the situation. Suppose further that the firms have access to country 4 whose figures are described in the following table. The game v 4 and the joint game are given in the following table.
Thus, the core of the joint game
Remark 2 As one can see, even though the cores of v 1 • v 2 and v 3 are non-empty, their joint game v 1 • v 2 • v 3 has an empty core, which is opposite to example 1.
Compatibility of games 4.1 Compatibility
In this section, we introduce the notion of compatibility. We say that games are compatible with each other if the core of the joint game is non-empty. This means that regardless of the stability of each individual game, the joint game is stable.
Definition 4 The games
In the following, we state a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a joint cooperative game, v 1 • · · · • v K . For this purpose, we introduce a concave integral for games (see Lehrer 2009) 
Definition 5 For a game v and a vector X ≥ 0 in R n , the concave integral is defined as follows:
where the minimum is taken over all additive games, P, such that
Remark 3 (i) The concave integral is defined as the minimum over a set of additive games. This minimum (as opposed to infimum) is justified because the set of the additive games P such that P ≥ v can be restricted, without loss of generality, to a bounded set, say P v . In other words, the concave integral can be defined as an infimum over a compact set of additive games, and therefore, the infimum is attained.
(ii) The minimum min P∈P v X d P is obtained in an extreme point of P v . Moreover, the set P v is defined by a finite number of linear inequalities, which makes P v a polyhedron. As such, it has a finite number of extreme points. We conclude that the concave integral is the minimum of finitely many linear functions (the extreme points of P v ) and is therefore continuous.
Remark 4 If v is additive, then cav X dv = X dv, which is why we can equally use cav X dv or X dv when working with additive games.
There is a dual approach to calculating cav X dv; the variable X can be decomposed as a linear combination of indicators. Clearly, X can be decomposed in many ways and among all the decompositions X = S⊆N α S · 1 S , where α S ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ N , the concave integral considers the one that maximizes
Remark 5 Since our analysis is in finite spaces, one may wonder why we use the notation in Definition 5 and Eq. (4.1). We have two reasons. First, we want to use standard notations used in the literature, such as the concave integral and the Choquet integral (Choquet 1955) (see below). Second, the integrals used here are indeed sums, but their domains change from one X to the other. That is, different X 's might have different decompositions that attain the maximum in Eq. (4.2). These different domains are concisely captured by the integral notation.
The classical definition of the totally balanced cover of a game v is
Note that due to Eq. (4.2), the totally balanced cover of v can be written also as,
One can now use the notion of the concave integral to re-state the Shapley-Bondareva theorem (see Shapley 1967) : For any game v,
C(v) = ∅ if and only if B v (N ) ≤ v(N ). (4.4)
Example 2 Consider v 1 in the previous example. There is an additive game which is the least of all additive games that satisfies P(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N : P(1) = 0.9, P(2) = 0.2, P(N ) = 1.1. Let X = (3, 2). Then, cav X dv 1 = 3·0.9+2·0.2 = 3.1. As for the dual approach, the decomposition that maximizes the right-hand side of Eq. (4.2) with respect to v 1 is X = 3 · 1 {1} + 2 · 1 {2} . Indeed, 3v 1 (1) + 2v 1 (1) = 3.1 = cav X dv 1 .
Note that X could be decomposed differently. For instance, X = 2 · 1 N + 1 {2} . But then, 2v 1 (N ) + v 1 (1) = 2 · 1 + 0.9 = 2.9 which is strictly smaller than cav X dv 1 .
The following two theorems are the main results of this paper. 
Proof See Appendix.
In order to characterize when games defined over different grand coalitions are compatible, we need some additional notation. Let (v 1 , N 1 ) , . . . , (v K (v 1 , N 1 ) 
Theorem 2 The games
Definition 6 A cooperative game, v, is a convex game if for two subsets S 1 , S 2 ,
Remark 6 The game v has a large core (Sharkey 1982) if for every S ⊆ N and for every additive game Q that satisfies v ≤ Q, there is P in the core of v such that P ≤ Q. It is shown in Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) that v has a large core if and only if
In other words, when v has a large core, the minimum in (4.1) can be taken over the core of v which is smaller than the set of all additive games that are greater than or equal to v. Furthermore, as noted in Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) , any convex game has a large core.
A non-trivial application of Theorem 2 is the following theorem: Proof See Appendix.
The following example shows that more than two convex games might be noncompatible.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and define three monotonic simple games. For each i = 1, 2, 3, the game v i has one minimal winning coalition, N \{i}. Since there is only one winning coalition, v i is convex. Consider now v = v 1 • v 2 • v 3 . It is also a simple game, and v(S) = 1 if and only if |S| ≥ 2. It implies that the core of v is empty, rendering v 1 , v 2 and v 3 non-compatible.
Another sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the joint game's core
In this section, we introduce another sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the joint game's core.
Example 4 Let N = {1, 2}, v 1 be a game where v 1 (1) = 1, v 1 (2) = .8 and v 1 (N ) = 2. Also let v 2 (1) = .9, v 2 (2) = .9 and v 2 (N ) = 2. The cores of the two games have at least one member in common, and v 1 • v 2 has a non-empty core. If we replace v 2 by v 2 , where v 2 (1) = .8, v 2 (2) = 1.1 and leave v 2 (N ) = 2, then the cores of v 1 and v 2 are disjoint, and the core of v 1 • v 2 is empty.
The following proposition states that, in this example, the linkage between the nonemptiness of the core of the joint game and the fact that the cores of the underlying games have at least one member in common is not coincidental.
Proposition 1 Let v 1 , . . . , v K be a set of games on the same grand coalition
This proposition implies in particular that when v
, if there is a core allocation that is common to all games, then the core of the joint game is not empty.
An application of this theorem is for simple games. Let v 1 , . . . , v K be K simple games, each having a non-empty core. Let us denote the set of veto players (the intersection of all the winning coalitions) of game i by U i . Then it is known that
Therefore, by using Proposition 1, one can see that v 1 • · · · • v K is a simple game with the veto players being U 1 ∩ · · · ∩ U K . On the other hand, there is no player who is a veto player in all games, if and only if the core of the joint game is empty.
Joint games and the least super-additive majorant
From a technical point of view, the definition of a joint game can be considered as a generalization of the notion 'least super-additive majorant' introduced in Shapley and Shubik (1969) . If v is a game, then a least super-additive majorant is introduced as
The gameṽ is the smallest super-additive game that dominates v. This concept was first introduced in Shapley and Shubik (1969) and was used to study the core of super-additive games. This concept was not later studied because it was not found to be helpful. Here we revisit this concept and put the definition in a correct direction within the context of joint games.
. Now assume that in Eq. (5.1), one could arbitrarily choose games among the set { (v 1 , N 1 ) , . . . , (v K , N K )}. The result would be,
This quantity is equal toṽ 1 • · · · •ṽ K (S). Thus, joint games are generalizations of least super-additive majorant games. Given that this paper assumes that a coalition, S, can be split into different partitions, one may wonder how we explain the choice of (2.3) over the following alternative:
Indeed, the definition in (5.3) can be accommodated by (2. 
A natural extension, which is related to our discussion in this section, is to extend the definition of compatibility by using c-cores. Let v be game. We introduce the game v c as follows,
The core of v c is known as the c-core and is denoted by C c (v). This concept was first introduced in Guesnerie and Oddou (1979) and further studied in Sun et al. (2008) . Now we can introduce the notion of c-compatibility for K games, v 1 , . . . , v K , on the same grand coalition N as:
The following result links c-compatibility to the compatibility of the least superadditive majorant, Proof See Appendix.
A concluding remark
In this paper, we have introduced the concept of a joint game and have developed testable conditions for determining whether or not its core is empty. In a joint game, it is typically better for the grand coalition to split into sub-coalitions and hence obtain a total value which is greater than the value of the grand coalition in the underlying games. We characterized when the core of the joint game is non-empty.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 We prove that the games v 1 , . . . , v K are compatible if and only if max
in six steps.
Step 1 Suppose that u(X ) = inf P∈Q X d P, where Q is a comprehensive, 4 convex and closed set of additive games. We show that u(X ) = −∞ whenever one of the coordinates of X is negative. Indeed, let X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n such that x r 0 < 0, for some 1 ≤ r 0 ≤ n, and let
which tends to −∞ when λ → ∞.
Step 2 Suppose that u i (X ) = inf P i ∈Q i X d P i , for i = 1, . . . , K , where Q i is a comprehensive set of additive games. The convolution of u 1 , . . . , u K , denoted u 1 · · · u K , is defined as
We claim that
In order to prove this claim, we use convex analysis. Consider a set of convex functions f 1 , . . . , f K from R n to R ∪ {+∞}, whose conjugates are defined as
The infimal convolution of these K functions is
We state the following version of Theorem 20, d) in Rockafellar (1973) to be used later.
Theorem 4
Suppose that ∃X ∈ R n and M ∈ R such that the set
is non-empty and bounded. Then,
Let f i = −u i . We verify that the condition of Theorem 4 is satisfied. TakeX = − → 0 and M = 0. First, for every i = 1, . . . , K Q i is comprehensive and therefore, f i is non-positive on R n + . In particular,
Second, according to Step 1, K ⊆ (R n + ) K . This implies thatX K is the only point in K, meaning that K is non-empty and bounded.
Having verified the condition of Theorem 4, we proceed to apply it to f i . By the definition of the conjugate function,
This implies that either f
We now elaborate on
On the other hand, if there exists i such that − P ∈ Q i , then due to the assumption that Q i is convex and closed, there is a unique R ∈ Q i such that R is the closest point (in the Euclidean norm) to −P in Q i . Let, X := −P − R = 0. The integral X d(−P) − X d R is bounded away from 0 for every R ∈ Q i . Thus, f * i (−P) = +∞. This implies that
Q i is a comprehensive, convex and closed set, the same argument just used implies that g * is equal to (6.3). Using Theorem 4, we conclude that h * = f * 1 + · · · + f * K = g * . Since h and g are both lower semicontinuous functions, it implies that they are equal (see Rockafellar 1973) . Thus, h(
which proves our claim.
Step 3 For a set of games v i , i = 1, . . . , K , and any additive game P, it is easy to see that
Step 4 Consider the games v 1 , . . . , v K and the functions u i (X ) = inf P∈Q i X d P, where Q i is the set of all additive games P such that P ≥ v i . Q i is comprehensive, convex and closed, and therefore, Step 1 applies. By the definition of the operator and Step 1 (u i (X i ) = −∞ for every X i ∈ R n + ), for X ≥ 0, we therefore have,
Note that the maximum is replacing the supremum because all concave functions, by Remark 3, are continuous and the set (
Step 5 For every S ⊆ N , the following equality holds,
In the first equality, we use the definition of the concave integral; in the second equality, we use Step 3; in the third, we use Step 2; and in the fourth equality, we use Step 4. Using X = 1 S , we get the result.
Step 6 Given Step 5 and (4.4) we have,
Proof of Theorem 2 Let
The inequality holds because 1≤i≤K
As for the inverse direction, for any positive number, M, and i = 1, . . . , K , define the game (v M i , N ) as follows.
which tends to −∞ as M → ∞. We obtain that for M large enough, the LHS is strictly greater than the RHS. Note that the M we found depends on the functions f 1 , . . . , f K under discussion. However, due to the fact that the convex integral is continuous and that the set 
. This implies Eq. (4.6), and the proof of Theorem 2 is complete.
Proof of Theorem 3 Let
Step 1: We first assume that
We therefore have, max (6.8) where the last equality is obtained by using the minimax theorem, as explained in what follows. Consider the zero-sum game in which player 1's set of strategies is
is player 2's set of strategies. Both sets are compact. Finally, the payoff function
The minimax theorem allows us now to change the order of the minimum and the maximum in order to obtain the last equality. Let (P * 1 , P * 2 ) and ( f * 1 , f * 2 ) be the optimal strategies of the players. In particular, ( f * 1 , f * 2 ) solves the maximization problem in the LHS of Eq. (6.8). For every j ∈ N , denote 5 M( j) = {i; P * i ( j) ≥ P * −i ( j)} = argmax i=1,2 P * i ( j). When i ∈ M( j), P * i ( j) is greater than or equal to P * −i ( j). Since ( f * 1 , f * 2 ) solves
Step 2 Now we complete the proof of the proposition. We have,
The first equivalence is the definition of compatibility. The second one is due to Lemma 3. The third equivalence is by (4.4), while the fourth and the fifth are due to Proposition 2. The last two equivalences result from (4.4) and the definition of compatibility, respectively.
